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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to study how taxpayers decide to evade part of their income un-
der certain constraints specific to the nature of their occupation. We further develop a model
on taxpayer’s compliance decision based on the Standard Model of Yitzhaki by introducing a
threshold defined as the fraction of the actual income that is declared. We also make compu-
tations to examine taxpayer’s response to changes in policy parameters such as the tax penalty
coefficient, the tax rate and the probability of tax audits to take place, with respect to the
income they decide to hide. We find that taxpayers are motivated to declare a higher portion
of their income when policy makers increase the tax penalty coefficient and arrange some more
frequent tax audits.
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1 Introduction
Tackling tax evasion has always been one of the challenges that governments face. Tax evasion
is the deliberate underreporting of income derived from a taxable activity and it is considered to
be part of the ”shadow economy” and thus an illegal activity. It can be blamed for deficits and
decreased revenues which are necessary to support various sectors of the economy such as education,
health systems, infrastructure and provide the necessary goods and services to the individuals. In
countries where the tax rate is relatively high and individuals are unsatisfied from public goods and
services, tax evasion may be a more serious problem, because in this case individuals care more
about maximizing their own utility by hiding income, ignoring the implications for social welfare.
When policy makers cannot collect enough tax revenues to have available for public spending, they
may take stricter measures such as increasing the tax rate to obtain the necessary revenues. This,
however, could be detrimental to honest taxpayers who reveal all of their income as they would
be obliged to pay for dishonest taxpayers as well, leading to a decrease in their utility and wealth
and finally to a welfare loss. In addition, raising tax rates becomes counterproductive after a point,
because it encourages tax evasion and discourages economic activity. Greece is an example where
tax rates continued to increase within the years as a response to tax evasion. Greece has suffered
from tax evasion persistently throughout the years starting long before the economic crisis of 2009.
The size of the Greek shadow economy was estimated to be up to 40% (Artavanis et al., 2016)[2].
This is an indication of how challenging it has been for the government to finance its debt. Both the
EU and the IMF have pointed to the need for increasing tax revenues and decreasing tax evasion.
As a result, policy makers proceeded to tax rate increases. However, these tax rate increases did
not contribute to collecting the estimated amount of tax revenues because of the persistence of some
taxpayer groups to hide their income. For example, Pappada Zylberberg (2015)[12] have shown
that the implementation of the austerity plan in 2010 in Greece which allowed for an increase in
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the tax rate was not efficient as tax revenues raised by a lower percent than was expected because
small and middle firms decreased their declared income. Thus, it is vital for policy makers to find
effective ways of combating the problem of tax evasion.
One way to achieve this goal is to increase tax penalty rates. An increase in the tax penalty
rate will not guarantee though positive results for the policy makers, because some occupations
are characterized by high opportunities for tax evasion and thus taxpayers can hide their income
more easily, because either tax audits may be less frequent or unreported income may be difficult
to detect. Besides adjusting tax penalty rates, policy makers could potentially combat tax evasion
by raising the probability of tax audits too. In the context of the Greek economy, it was found
that higher probabilities of tax audits on risk-averse firms may be a more effective method to deter
tax evasion than raising tax penalties (Goumagias, Hristu-Varsakelis, 2012)[6]. However, increasing
the frequency of tax audits may be costly for the government as policy makers would spend more
resources needed to make proper and careful tax audits such as hiring experts. In addition, it should
be taken into account that the desired outcome of minimizing tax evasion problem by both from
rising tax penalty rates and the frequency of tax audits may be outweighed by an increase in tax
rates. Policy makers could impose increases in tax rates in order to raise tax revenues. In this
case, it is not certain how taxpayers will respond to this increase and it may be possible to become
motivated to hide their income when they face an increasing tax rate as we will show in the next
sections of the thesis. Clotfelter (1983)[4] also showed that an increase in US tax rates tends to
encourage tax evasion.
In this thesis, we study taxpayers’ decision to hide income under certain constraints specific to
their occupation in the context of the Greek economy. In particular, we will examine taxpayers’
response to changes in tax penalty coefficient and probability of a random tax audit to take place
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in the context of tackling tax evasion. We will also examine how these changes increase or decrease
the expected amount of tax revenues. By studying taxpayers’ decision to hide income and the risk
they face, governments not only should be able to design policies which restrict this illegal activity
by targeting specific groups of taxpayers, but also to collect more tax revenues. This study offers
a computational tool needed to explore the taxpayers’ decision to hide income under constraints
which are specific to their occupation. Some occupations provide the opportunity to taxpayers to
hide more income such as large enterprises, whereas other occupations such as salaried employees do
not make it easy to engage in tax evasion as their wages and salaries are known by the government
and therefore it is more probable for salaried employees to get caught by tax authorities. Because
there is a large set of occupations in the job market, we will study compliance decision in terms of
occupational group to which different taxpayers belong. Thus, we assume that each taxpayer group
faces constraints regarding tax evasion which is the same for all taxpayer members belonging to the
same group.
In particular, we extend the Standard Model of Yitzaki (Yitzaki, 1974) by introducing in the utility
maximization problem a threshold ai which is defined as the fraction of the income that a taxpayer
group i declares and therefore it reflects the tax evasion opportunities of a specific occupation
category. This threshold ai though takes a minimum value hi for each taxpayer group such that
ai ≥ hi depicting the lower bound on the fraction of income that a taxpayer group could declare.
This value hi will be low for some occupations allowing taxpayers to declare only a small portion
of their actual income, and high for other occupations where taxpayers cannot avoid to declaring
a larger portion of their income. However, the amount of income that will be finally declared
depends on the self-interested optimal level a∗ that maximizes each taxpayer group’s utility. It is
possible as we show in the section 4 that a taxpayer group’s utility is maximized at the point where
taxpayers report a higher level of income rather than the lowest possible income level which they
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could have declared it. The addition of the threshold a to the model corrects for the assumption in
(Yitzhaki, 1974) that all taxpayers are able to evade to the same degree and will allow us to observe
how digression from the self-interested optimal level of tax evasion opportunities that maximizes
taxpayer’s utility affects his or her ”current” utility.
We also extend the model by using constant relative risk-aversion utility function as Yitzhaki’s
model assumes absolute risk-aversion which implies that an increase in the tax rate decreases the
amount of hidden income, a notion that might not be in accord with empirical data. Using MATLAB,
we will calculate the optimum level of threshold a that maximizes the utility for several occupation
groups taking into account different levels of tax penalties, tax rates and probabilities of random
tax audits. Therefore, we will know the maximum fraction of the income that each taxpayer group
on average will declare and compare it to the lower bound h on the fraction of the income that
taxpayers could declare given the values of the other parameters. If it is in the interest of taxpayers
to declare the lowest possible income because at that amount of declared income their utility is
maximized, then policy makers should use specific tools such as increasing tax penalty coefficients
or organizing more frequent tax audits to motivate taxpayers to behave more compliantly.
For that reason, we will examine different scenarios where in each of them we will observe taxpayer
group decision-making regarding tax evasion when the tax penalty varies or when the probability
of a random tax audit is high. These scenarios depict how taxpayers’ decision-making with respect
to hiding income changes when policy makers tackle tax evasion problem. We expect that high tax
penalties will change taxpayers’ decision towards tax compliance, whereas a higher probability of a
tax audit will leave taxpayers’ decision unchanged.
Apart from tackling tax evasion, policy makers take measures to increase tax revenues. More
specifically, we will examine how changes in the tax penalty coefficient f , the probability of a tax
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audit p, the tax rate coefficient t or the lower bound on the fraction of taxpayers’ income h may
affect the collection of tax revenues. We expect that either giving emphasis on tax tax penalty by
increasing highly the tax penalty coefficient or developing mechanisms to make tax declaration more
transparent and thus increasing the lower bound of the portion of the actual income, tax revenues
will increase.
In conclusion, the thesis is structured as follows. In chapter 2 there will be a brief discussion on
the literature review. In chapter 3 there will be a description on the structure of our model under
the specific constraints that taxpayer groups deal with. In chapter 4 simulation results are presented
regarding the taxpayer group decision to hide income when the tax penalty, the probability of a tax
audit, the tax rate and the lower bound on the fraction of the income change for specific values of
the risk-aversion coefficient which we assume they are constant for all the scenarios.
2 Previous Literature
In the relevant literature we can distinguish between the neoclassical approach of modelling tax-
ation and that of behavioral economics which attempts to replace the assumptions of the former
approach with more realistic ones. Allingham and Sandmo(1972)[1] were the first to establish the
neoclassical account of taxation by introducing a theoretical model of individual taxpayers’ decision
with respect to the size of tax evasion. They assumed that taxpayers are homogeneous and rational
and that they face two decisions under risk: a) to declare all of their income and b) to declare less
than their income with the risk of being detected. Yitzhaki(1974)[15] introduced modifications to
the standard model of Allingham-Sandmo (A-S), where the punishment for tax evasion is calculated
as a fine levied on unpaid tax rather than on undeclared income.
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There are of course limitations to Yitzhaki’s model. The model predicts that tax evasion becomes
less attractive as we increase the probability of being detected as well as with an increasing tax
rate because of the absolute risk-aversion hypothesis. This does not agree with empirical data
as taxpayers tend to overestimate the probability of a tax audit being conducted. Second, the
standard models of A-S and Yitzhaki assume that all individuals are involved in tax evasion; this
is also unrealistic, as some taxpayers face obstacles in hiding their income because of the nature of
their job. Finally, Yitzhaki’s Model assumes absolute risk-aversion on behalf of taxpayers. However,
taxpayers’ decisions with respect to the amount of income conceal changes when relative risk-aversion
is assumed. ”Hidden” income could be reduced when the level of risk-aversion of the average taxpayer
increases . In terms of risk-aversion, Bernasconi (1998)[3] uses a model of tax evasion with two
different orders of risk averse preferences and show that the excess degree of risk aversion is not
required to explain tax compliance, as implied by the portfolio choice approach. By calibrating the
preferences of a taxpayer whose attitude towards risk is of order one with parameters obtained from
empirical and experimental studies and using representative values of the tax rate and tax penalty,
the paper shows that there is not an excess rate of tax compliance. Although it is difficult to alter
the taxpayer’s attitude towards risk, it is possible for the government to change and optimize the
allocation of tax audits with the more frequent ones to take place for the less risk-averse taxpayers
(Goumagias, Hristu-Varsakelis, Assael, 2017)[7].
More recent literature has introduced some behavioral features to the A-S model to make it
more realistic. Behavioral economic models make use of non-expected utility models based on the
Prospect Theory Model which can reverse the taxpayer’s decision to evade taxation, if social factors
entered models. In particular, Quiggin(1982)[14] formalized a so-called Anticipated Utility Theory
by suggesting that decision weights should depend on all individual probabilities, thus correcting the
assumption that taxpayers ”overweight” the possibility of extreme outcomes. In addition, Piolatto
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and Rablen (2013)[13] examined the role of the Prospect Theory in reverting the Yitzhaki puzzle
which predicts a negative relationship between tax rates and tax evasion. However, their results
showed that the diminishing sensitivity of the utility function is not a necessary condition for the
dependent model to overturn Yitzhaki puzzle, as the puzzle can be reversed by endogenizing the
reference level of wealth. The loss aversion and the probability weighting are irrelevant to the
puzzle too. Therefore, for the aforementioned elements, they found that the Prospect Theory failed
to reverse Yitzhaki puzzle. Taking into account behavioural factors, Loomes and Sugden(1986,
1987)[10] proposed that the disappointment derived from a poor outcome, such as in the case of a
tax audit being conducted, will reduce taxpayer’s utility and therefore this sentiment represents the
taxpayer from making risky decisions to some extent (Myles, Tran-Nam, 2013)[8]. Furthermore,
the introduction of social factors in the taxpayer’s tax compliance model may reverse the tax effect.
By social factors, we refer to psychic costs, social customs, perception of fairness and tax morale.
Lee (2016)[9] considers the role of tax evasion with morality in determining equity of the tax system
by using a standard model of tax evasion which incorporates in taxpayers expected utility function
a parameter capturing the moral costs proportional to evasion. The analysis has shown that an
increase in the moral costs decreases evasion. In addition, the equity of the tax system depends on
the degree of morality. With low moral costs, evasion makes the tax system regressive, whereas with
high moral costs, evasion makes the tax system progressive.
Empirical literature has also studied the nature and the extent of tax evasion in the Greek economy.
Matsaganis, Leventi and Flevotomou (2012)[11] examine the distributional aspects of tax evasion in
Greece by combining an estimation of non-compliance patterns in terms of under-reporting income
with an estimation of the distribution gains from tax evasion. They employ a direct approach to tax
evasion by comparing data form tax returns with survey data, and assume that taxpayers hide part
of their income from fiscal authorities, but they reveal it to an anonymous reviewer. Their results
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show that under-reporting income depends on the level of income. In addition, tax evasion increases
average disposable income and reduces tax yield, thus increasing inequality and relative poverty. It
also reduces tax receipts, and the tax system becomes less progressive. The sovereign debt crisis has
not significantly changed the distribution patterns of under-reporting income. In addition, studies
show the extent of tax evasion problem due to the inefficiencies of the tax system.
Pappada Zylberberg (2012) have shown that the implementation of the austerity plan in 2010
in Greece which allowed for an increase in the tax rate was not efficient as tax revenues raised by a
lower percent than was expected because small and middle firms decreased their declared income.
Georgakopoulos (2016)[5] analyses available data to map out the problem of tax evasion in Greece
and provides policy recommendations. The revenue losses are due to tax evasion associated with
both direct and indirect taxes, and the scale of evasion ranges from 11 to 16 billion euro a year.
The revenues lost are mainly associated with personal income tax evasion, ranging from 1.9-4.7%
of GDP, and with VAT evasion, amounting to 3,5% of GDP. In 2011, 8% of taxpayers, representing
highly paid workers, and 0.4% of taxpayers, representing large firms, paid 69% and 61% of personal
income tax and legal entity income tax, respectively. The self-employed are the taxpayers who hide
a large share of their income, from 57-59%. The shadow economy, amounting to 20-30% of GDP,
constitutes a part of the economy which avoids paying taxes. A reduction in tax rates, electronic tax
administration, penalties, simplification of the tax system are some of the policy recommendations.
3 Modeling
This study pursues a rigorous approach of a taxpayer’s utility maximization constrained by a
threshold which puts an upper bound to the degree to which he or she can evade taxes. Because in the
real world there is a large set of occupations, we study taxpayer behaviour in terms of occupational
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group to which they belong. Thus, we consider four different occupation groups defined by ISCO
in order to create taxpayers group. Specifically, taxpayer group i consists of all taxpayers belonging
to the same occupation group, consisting of all jobs with a high degree of similarity, such as skill
specialization (ISCO-08 Resolution).
Let Y,X,E, ai be the actual, declared, undeclared income, and the threshold of tax evasion
opportunities respectively, for each taxpayer group i. Undeclared income Ei is defined as Ei =
Yi − Xi. Because the average taxpayer in the group i desires to maximize his/her utility which
depends on the disposal income(?), each group i faces a choice on how much income could be
hidden. The taxpayer’s decision whether to declare all or partly of his/her income is constrained
by the threshold ai which allows each taxpayer group to evade tax up to a certain point. Thus, we
define the declared income Xi as Xi = aiYi, so that ai is to be understood as the fraction of actual
income which the taxpayer reveals. ai is measured between 0 and 1. The closest to 1, the less the
level of tax evasion it is. We will also assume that the tax T is proportional to declared income, i.e,
T (x)= tx, and that any tax penalties , F , levied on taxpayers when they are caught in a random
tax audit are proportional to undeclared income, i.e, F(E)= ftE. Taxpayer utility also depends on
the probability p of a random tax audit taking place. Therefore, the decision problem of taxpayer
group i can be formulated:
max
ai
V = piUi(Yd) + [1− pi]Ui(Yd) (1)
where Ui(Yd) is the utility function for taxpayer’s group i. We also assume constant relative
risk-aversion utility function:
Ui(Yd) =
Y 1−λid
1− λi (2)
where λi is the risk-aversion coefficient for taxpayer group i, and Yd is the level of disposable
income. The disposal income takes into account two possible situations:: to tax evade and get away
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with it, and tax evade and be caught. Therefore the disposal income Y d is equal to
Y di = pi[Yi(1− t)− ftYi(1− ai)] + (1− pi)[Yi(1− t) + tYi(1− ai)] (3)
Thus,the taxpayer’s decision problem takes on the form:
max
ai
Vi = p
[Yi(1− t)− ftYi(1− ai)]1−λ
1− λ + (1− pi)
[Yi(1− t) + tYi(1− ai)]1−λ
1− λ (4)
subject to ai ≥ hi where hi is the minimum value of threshold a can allow a taxpayer group to
declare its income.
If the problem is unconstrained, the necessary condition for a maximum with respect to the
threshold a∗i of tax evasion opportunities is:
dVi
dai
= 0 (5)
Solving with respect to a∗i we obtain:
a∗i =
1 + (1− t+ ft)( 1−pfp )
1
λ
t+ ft( 1−pfp )
1
λ
(6)
Under the constraint ai ≥ hi, the necessary condition for the optimum threshold a∗i changes:
dVi
dai
(ai − hi) = 0 (7)
Therefore, there are four cases which are going to be tested using MATLAB.
3.1 Effect on ai∗
In the previous analysis, we examined how each taxpayer group i decides to hide part of the actual
income in order to maximize utility given specific values of the other parameters. We determined
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mathematically the optimum level of the threshold a that determines the optimum fraction of income
that each taxpayer group i desires to declare. Then, we are able to determine how changes in the
amount of each of our parameters (t, f, p, h) may affect the optimum threshold ai∗. This would
be helpful for policy makers as we show in the section 4 to know which measures to take with
respect to tax penalty or tax audits so as to combat the problem of tax evasion. At the same time,
policy makers care about raising more tax revenues. Tax revenues could be potentially increased
through an increase in the tax rate, the tax penalty and the frequency of tax audits. However, these
increases may not lead to an efficient collection of tax revenues since taxpayers may not respond to
these increases compliantly and consequently tax evasion will still be an important obstacle for the
collection of tax revenues. Therefore, it is vital to examine which specific tool that policy makers
can use contributes to a higher expected amount of tax revenues.
3.1.1 Effect of changes in tax rate t
Based on (4), if the problem is unconstrained, a change in the optimal level of a∗i because of a
change in the tax rate is equal to:
da∗i
dt
=
f( 1−pfp )
2
λ − t( 1−pfp )
1
λ − ( 1−pfp )
1
λ − 1
(t+ ft( 1−pfp )
1
λ )2
(8)
Because the denominator t+ft( 1−pfp )
1
λ )2 is always positive, the relationship between a∗i and t depends
on the sign of f( 1−pfp )
2
λ − t( 1−pfp )
1
λ − ( 1−pfp )
1
λ − 1. Thus, an increase in the tax rate may increase
or decrease the optimal level of a and consequently it may decrease or increase the evaded income
respectively. In this case, it is not straightforward how a change in the tax rate will affect the
threshold a and consequently the level of evaded income as this link depends on the parameters of
f , t, p and λ. However, in the Yitzhaki’s model assuming for absolute risk-aversion, an increase in
the tax rate leads to a decrease in the level of evaded income, a conclusion which may not accord
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with reality When the tax penalty f increases, the ratio dadt becomes less negative which means that
the amount of tax evasion decreases. Given the levels of fine f , tax rate t and the probability of a
tax audit p, the optimal level of threshold a∗i can be computationally calculated and thus we can
find how the relationship between a∗i and t is defined. ai can never take the value zero, as every
taxpayer is obliged to declare a certain amount of income.
3.1.2 Effect of changes in tax penalty coefficient f
With respect to tax penalty coefficient f , a change in the optimum level a∗i because of a change
in the tax penalty coefficient is :
da∗i
df
=
t(t− 1)(γ 1λ − γ 2λ ) + δ((1− t)(1 + f))
t2(1 + fγ
1
λ )2
(9)
where γ = 1−pfp and δ =
t(1−p)γ( 1−λλ )
f2λp . We observe that t
2(1 + fγ
1
λ )2 is always positive for every
values of t, f, p, λ. The sign of δ((1− t)(1 + f)) is also positive. But, for every t ∈ (0, 1) the sign of
t(t − 1) is negative. Thus, in order to determine the relationship between changes in the optimum
a∗i and changes in the tax penalty coefficient we need to know the sign of γ
1
λ − γ 2λ . If the condition
f < 1−pp holds for every f ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ (0, 1), then γ
1
λ −γ 2λ is negative and da∗idf is positive. That
is, a potential increase in the tax penalty coefficient may also lead to an increase in the optimum
threshold a∗i , increasing the amount of income declared by each taxpayer group i. This positive
relationship between the optimum threshold and the tax penalty coefficient was expected since we
assumed that each taxpayer group consists of risk-averse taxpayers who are motivated to declared
more of their actual income when the amount of tax penalty increases in case they are caught of tax
evasion.
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3.1.3 Effect of changes in the probability of tax audits p
Based on (4), if the problem is unconstrained, a change in the optimal level of a∗i because of a change
in the probability of a tax audit to take place is equal to:
da∗i
dp
=
(( 1−pfp )
1−λ
λ )( ft(1−t)fp2 +
t(1−t)
fp2 )
λ(t+ ft( 1−pfp )
1
λ )2
(10)
We observe that for any given value of the parameters λ, f, p ∈ (0, 1) the denominator λ(t +
ft( 1−pfp )
1
λ )2 is always positive. For any given values of λ, f, p, t, ( 1−pfp )
1−λ
λ is positive and ft(1−t)fp2 +
t(1−t)
fp2 is positive.Thus,
da∗i
dp is positive which implies that a potential increase in the probability of
tax audits may lead to an increase in the optimum threshold a∗i and consequently to an increase
in the declared income of each taxpayer group. This positive relationship between the optimum
threshold and the probability of tax audits was also expected since risk-averse taxpayers behave
more compliantly and declare more of their actual income when more tax audits are to take place.
3.1.4 Effect of changes in h
As we mentioned above, h denotes the lower bound of the fraction of the actual income that is
declared. Assuming for a concave utility function, if h is lower than the optimal threshold a∗ then
da∗i
dh > 0 and if h is higher than a∗ da
∗
i
dh < 0.
3.2 Effect on tax revenues
Tax revenues are defined by the equation T = t ∗ Y where t is the tax rate and Y is the actual
income of all taxpayer groups. However, because some taxpayers hide part of their income and some
others do not the actual income Y may differ from with the declared income X for each taxpayer
group i. Thus, we use the amount of declared income X to calculate tax revenues T = t∗X collected
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from all taxpayer groups. The total amount of tax revenues is defined as follows:
R =
n∑
i=1
t ∗Xi =
n∑
i=1
t ∗ ai ∗ Yi
We also need to measure how changes in either the tax rate t, or the tax penalty coefficient f , or
the probability of tax audits p, or the lower bound h may affect tax revenues. In section 4 we show
the results from calculating the marginal effect of each parameter on tax revenues for each taxpayer
group seperately.
As we will discuss in the next section we will assume that the lowest level of ai is 0.2. On the
other hand, there may be taxpayers who are fully obedient to the law or their job does not allow
them to tax evade (ai = 1). Thus, the threshold ai takes a minimum value which is greater than
0. If we know the actual ai for each taxpayer group, we can compare it to the optimum level of a
∗
i
of the each group. Therefore, we will proceed to find changes in the utility of each taxpayer group.
By examining the effect of a potential change in taxpayers’ threshold a on their utility, we would
be able to explore ways which will influence the threshold of tax evasion opportunities, such as an
increased probability of a tax audit. That way our model would predict how taxpayer’s behaviour
may change in terms of utility due to a potential tax policy alteration.
4 Simulation Results
Let us assume we have four out of ten different occupations according to Independent Authority
for Public Revenue (IAPR) : Enterprises, Rentiers, Agricultural workers, Salaried workers. For each
group we assign a minimum threshold of tax evasion opportunities under which they cannot tax
evade, where hi = [0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8] respectively. For example, we assume a minimum threshold
hi = 0.2 for enterprises which means that they could declare up to 20% of their income since they
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may be more flexible than other occupation categories to hide income derived from the company’s
profits. In contrast, salaried employees who work in the public sector get their wages directly from the
government and therefore they are restricted regarding tax evasion opportunities (hi = 0.8). Thus,
taxpayer groups are divided into four job categories. In this case, we assume that the minimum level
of tax evasion opportunities is hi = 0.2. By assigning each profession to a tax evasion threshold and
given the values of f , t, pi and Xi, which is the declared income, we are able to calculate (using
MATLAB) the optimal level of threshold a∗ corresponding to each taxpayer group and then compare
it to the minimum level hi. We assume that the levels of f , t, p are the same for all taxpayer groups.
The risk-aversion coefficient λi differs across taxpayer groups but we assume that it is between 2
and 4. We will also need to the actual taxpayer’s income Yi for the calculation of each taxpayer’s
group average utility. The actual income Yi will be approximately estimated through the equation
Xi = aiYi, where Xi is obtained from the IAPR database for each occupation category for the year
2016. For Enterprises, Rentiers, Agricultural workers and Salaried workers the average declared
income is approximately 18,300, 4300, 9500 and 14200 respectively. Then we can proceed to the
calculation of the average utility for each taxpayer group through the following utility function
Ui =
Y 1−λid
1− λi (11)
In practice, it is possible that taxpayers may not be able to hide the greatest amount of income that
maximizes their utility because as we mentioned earlier they are constrained by frequent tax audits.
Thus, we should take into account that the minimum level of income that taxpayers can declare
defined by threshold a may differ from the level of income that they can declare at which level their
utility is maximized and a∗i holds. In some cases though, taxpayers’ utility maximizes when they
can declare the minimum level of income or in other words when a∗i = hi. In order to make these
taxpayer groups to declare more than the minimum, policy makers should find tools to ”move” the
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point where their utility maximizes away from the minimum level of threshold a. Therefore we can
observe the changes in the utility of these groups by calculating the utility function and then the
optimum level of utility U∗i using the optimum level a
∗
i of each occupation category. Finding the
utility function, we are able to observe how digressing from the optimum threshold level a∗i each
taxpayer’s group utility changes. Thus, the government could change tax rate or fine level to target
this group mostly benefit from tax evasion opportunities.
As we mentioned earlier, policy makers can either increase the tax penalty coefficient or make
more frequent tax audits to tackle tax evasion problem. We will examine four scenarios. In the
first three scenarios we will study how increases in the tax penalty coefficient f affects the optimum
threshold a∗ holding all the other parameters of the model constant and in the fourth scenario we
will study the effect of increases in the probability of tax audits to take place holding all the other
parameters again constant. We will start assuming that the probability for a tax audit to take
place is p = 0.05, the tax penalty coefficient equals f = 0.5 and the tax rate is t = 0.29. The
risk-aversion coefficient is assumed to be different among taxpayer groups, as taxpayers differ across
groups according to their occupation category. We will also assume that taxpayer groups with a
lower threshold ai deal with a lower risk-aversion coefficient since taxpayers who are aware of the
fact that their threshold of tax evasion opportunities is low and thus they can declare a lower percent
of their actual income they may take more risk to evade taxes. Empirical literature has shown that
risk-aversion coefficient is around λ = 2. Goumagias & Varsakelis have estimated the risk-aversion
coefficient around λ = 3, λ = 4. Thus, λ ∈ [2, 4].
4.1 Changing the f
4.1.1 First case: f = 0.5, t = 0.29, p = 0.05
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Table 1: Values of λi, hi, a
∗
i and Ti for each taxpayer group i corresponding to f = 0.5.
Parameters for group i = 1, 2, 3, 4
λi 3 4 6 9
hi 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
ai∗ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.3
Ti 5307 1247 2755 4147
For a tax penalty coefficient f = 0.5, a tax rate t = 0.29 and a probability of a random tax audit
p = 0.05, we have calculated using MATLAB the optimal threshold a∗i for each taxpayer group i.
We also assumed that the risk-aversion coefficient is 3, 4, 6 and 9 for each group respectively with
the enterprises being the least risk-averse group from all the others (λi). Table 1 shows that the
optimal level of a∗i given the values of all the other parameters is equal to the minimum value hi for
each group i. This means that the threshold ai that maximizes the average utility for each group
i is equal to the minimum value that threshold ai can take. Thus, taxpayers will be motivated to
declare the lowest possible income they can as their utility is maximized at the minimum level of
declared income. As a result, in this case, policy makers should take specific measures to make
taxpayers become more obedient and declare more of their actual income. This could be possibly
done by ”moving” the maximum level of their utility function away from the point where each
taxpayer group i declare the lowest possible level of income. In other words, policy makers should
either increase the tax penalty f or arrange more frequent audits leading to a higher probability p
of a tax audit to take place in order to make a∗i higher than the minimum level hi.
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4.1.2 Second case: f = 2, t = 0.29, p = 0.05
In this case, we assume that policy makers take stricter measures and increase the tax penalty
coefficient to 200%, while keeping constant the tax rate at t = 0.29 and the probability at p = 0.05
. We observe now that a large penalty coefficient above 1 is able to change the optimum threshold
a∗i for all the categories. In particular, for the first taxpayer group with minimum thresholds of
0.2, its optimum level of tax evasion opportunities increase by a larger percent comparatively to
the other groups. Enterprises face now an optimum threshold a∗i = 0.4773 which corresponds to an
increase of 139%, while rentiers face an optimum threshold a∗i = 0.5899 corresponding to an increase
of 47% less than 100%. This could be possibly explained by the fact that before the tax penalty
increase, enterprises had the incentive to declare only 20% of their actual income, but now their
utility is maximized when they declare a larger portion of their income as they are more ”afraid” to
be caught and pay a large penalty.
Table 2: Values of λi, hi, a
∗
i and Ti for each taxpayer group i corresponding to f = 2.
Parameters for group i = 1, 2, 3, 4
λi 3 4 6 9
hi 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
ai∗ 0.4773 0.5899 0.7150 0.8050
Xi 43737 6321 11305 14389.37
Ti 12683.73 1833.09 3278.45 4172.81
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4.2 Changing the p
4.2.1 First case:f = 0.5, t = 0.29, p = 0.1
Table 3: Values of λi, hi, a
∗
i and for each taxpayer group i corresponding to p = 0.1.
Parameters for group i = 1, 2, 3, 4
λi 3 4 6 9
hi 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
ai∗ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4512
Table 3 shows that when the tax penalty coefficient is constant at f = 0.5 and policy makers
decide to make more frequent audits increasing the probability of a tax audit at p = 0.1 each
taxpayers’ group decision regarding tax evasion does not change. Even though now the probability
of being caught tax evading is higher than in the previous cases, taxpayers may not feel ”afraid”
enough because the penalty they face in case they get caught is still small enough to persuade them
to become more obedient.
4.2.2 Second case:f = 2, t = 0.29, p = 0.1
However, when the probability of a tax audit to take place increases at p = 0.1 and at the same
time the tax penalty coefficient increases at f = 2, we observe that each taxpayer group changes its
behaviour and declares a larger portion of income. This combined increase leads to a higher level
of optimum threshold than in the cases when separately the tax penalty increases and tax audits
become more frequent. Thus, taxpayers are more motivated to behave compliantly and declare a
larger amount of their actual income.
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Table 4: Values of λi, hi, a
∗
i , Xi and Ti for each taxpayer group i corresponding to p = 0.1.
Parameters for group i = 1, 2, 3, 4
λi 3 4 6 9
hi 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
ai∗ 0.6295 0.7144 0.8046 0.8676
Xi 57462 7654 12730 15501
Ti 16663.98 2219.66 3691.7 4495.29
4.3 Changing the t
Increases in the tax rate is the common measure which policy makers take to raise more tax
revenues. However, the final amount of tax revenues may differ from the expected one. This could
be explained by the fact that some taxpayers hide a part of their income. In this section we examine
how a small increase in the tax rate affects the taxpayers’ decision to hide income and consequently
the collection of tax revenues. Initially we assume that the tax penalty coefficient is set to f = 0.5
and the probability of tax audits to p = 0.05 and that policy makers decide to increase the tax rate
by 3.4% which corresponds to a tax rate t = 0.3. Again we assume that the level of the actual
income is given and constant but unknown.
Table 5 shows that at these given levels of our parameters, each taxpayer group does not have the
incentive to declare a larger portion of income and thus the increase in tax revenues will come only
from the increase in the tax rate and not from any potential increase in the declared income. In
particular, the increase in tax revenues coming from each taxpayer group will be 622.2, 146.2, 323,
and 486.2 monetary units respectively with the enterprises contributing more to the tax revenues.
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Table 6 shows the computational results of another scenario. Let us now assume that policy
makers increase the tax rate by 3.4% (t = 0.3), but the tax penalty coefficient is now f = 2 and
the probability of tax audits still at p = 0.05. At these given levels of the parameters, taxpayers’
decision to hide income change and they have a higher incentive to declare a larger amount of their
income because of a higher punishment (f = 2). Each taxpayer group deals with a higher optimum
threshold a∗i and thus they deal with a higher declared income Xi. In this case, we observe that the
increase in tax revenues is higher than in the previous case (Table 5) since not only the increase in
the tax rate contributes to more tax revenues, but also a higher rate of tax penalty which makes
taxpayers feel more ”afraid” to act non-compliantly by hiding income.
Table 5: Values of λi, hi, a
∗
i and Ti for each taxpayer group i corresponding to t = 0.29.
Parameters where f = 0.5, p = 0.05, t = 0.29
λi 3 4 6 9
hi 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
ai∗ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Xi 18300 4300 9500 14300
Ti 5490 1290 2850 4290
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Table 6: Values of λi, hi, a
∗
i , Xi and Ti for each taxpayer group i corresponding to t = 0.3.
Parameters where f = 2, p = 0.05, t = 0.3
λi 3 4 6 9
hi 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
ai∗ 0.5018 0.6092 0.7283 0.8142
Xi 45923.85 6510.63 11508.5 14533.26
Ti 13777.155 1953.19 3452.55 4359.9
4.4 Changing the h
In this section we examine how an increase in the lower bound on the fraction of the actual
income of each taxpayer group may affect tax revenues. Practically, the increase in the h could be
potentially achieved though the development of a more transparent tax system. For example, the
provision of receipts could contribute to a higher h. That is, each taxpayer group will be forced to
declare a higher amount of the actual income. Let us assume that the required provision of receipts
increase the lower bound h by 10%. According to the equation Xi = ai ∗ Yi, this increase results
in a higher level of declared income by 10% as we assume that the actual income Yi is constant for
each taxpayer group i.
Table 7 shows the initial values of the lower bound hi, the optimal level a
∗
i , the declared income Xi
and tax revenues Ti for each taxpayer group i before the implementation of the receipts provision.
We also assume that in this initial situation that the tax penalty coefficient is equal to f = 0.5, the
probability of a tax audit is p = 0.05 and the tax rate holds for t = 0.3. At this initial situation
given the values of the parameters it is in the interest of each taxpayer group to declare the lowest
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possible income they can as in all groups hi = a
∗
i as we mentioned in the section 4.1.1.
Table 7: Values of λi, hi, a
∗
i , Xi and Ti for each taxpayer group i before hi changes.
Parameters where f = 0.5 and t = 0.29
λi 3 4 6 9
hi 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
ai∗ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Xi 18300 4300 9500 14300
Ti 5307 1247 2755 4147
Now table 8 shows the values of hi, a
∗
i , Xi after the implementation of the obligatory provision of
receipts. In this table we also include the change in tax revenues after this implementation. As we
mentioned above, we assume that the required provision of receipts results in an increase of the lower
bound h on the fraction of the actual income by 10%. Using computational calculation, we observe
that after the increase in the lower bound hi by 10% given the values of the other parameters, it is
in the interest of each taxpayer group i to declare the lowest possible income they can but higher
than in the case without the required provision of receipts. Since the optimal level a∗i has increased
relatively to the initial situation, each taxpayer group will declare a higher amount of the actual
income. That is the declared income for enterprises, rentiers, agricultural workers and salaried
workers is now 20130, 4730, 10450 and 15730 respectively. Given the same tax rate of t = 0.3, this
increase of the lower bound hi which led to a higher declared income level Xi results in an increase
in the amount of expected tax revenues with the higher increase coming mostly from enterprises and
the salaried workers.
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Table 8: Values of λi, hi, a
∗
i , Xi and Ti for each taxpayer group i after hi changes.
Parameters where f = 0.5 and t = 0.29
λi 3 4 6 9
hi 0.22 0.44 0.66 0.88
ai∗ 0.22 0.44 0.66 0.88
Xi 20130 4730 10450 15730
Ti 5890.77 1384.17 3058.05 4603.17
dTi 583.77 137.17 303.05 456.17
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, tax evasion will continue to become a challenge for policy makers since every
taxpayer group cares about maximizing its utility by declaring a smaller amount of income than
the actual one. However, each taxpayer group faces some constraints with respect to the amount
of income they desire to hide. By nature, some taxpayers deal with higher constraints than others
because they occupied in the public sector and thus their income comes mostly from wages which
wages are known to policy makers. As a result, a small level of declared income can easily raise
doubts about the honesty of those taxpayers’ tax declaration. Since those taxpayers know the fact
that they are highly constrained by their occupation to hide a large portion of their income, they
tend to behave more compliantly.
We also solved for the threshold of tax evasion opportunities to find the optimum fraction of the
actual income that is in the interest of each taxpayer group to declare. After finding the threshold
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level that maximizes each group’s utility function, we proceeded to compare it with the lower bound
which defines the lowest possible income level each group can declare. Then, we examined different
scenarios where each them depicts taxpayers’ decision to hide income under certain changes which
policy makers adopt.
In particular, we observe that taxpayers could be potentially motivated to declare a larger portion
of their actual income if policy makers adopt proper and efficient measures. These measures should
target to a higher utility level of taxpayers combined with a higher amount of declared income.
As we examined in section 4, policy makers raise more tax revenues when they impose a high tax
penalty coefficient and arrange some slightly frequent tax audits. We saw that for specific values
of risk-aversion a higher tax penalty coefficient is the driving force of minimizing tax evasion since
taxpayers become more ”afraid” to hide a large portion of income when punishment is strict. At
low levels of tax penalty, an increase in the probability of tax audits is not enough to intimidate
taxpayers to declare more income. We also observed that a small increase in the tax rate can raise
tax revenues but not as much as a high tax penalty coefficient combined with a high probability of
tax audit can do. Finally, we saw that even the implementation of required provision of receipts
which is reflected in a higher lower bound fraction of income for all taxpayer groups can contribute
to a higher expected amount of tax revenues, but a smaller one than a high tax penalty along with
more frequent tax audits.
These findings will be helpful for policy makers to design effectively tax policy in order to raise
the expected amount of tax revenues and to minimize as much as they can the extent of tax evasion
activity.
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N = 4;
λ(i) = [3, 4, 6, 9];
f = 0.5;
t = 0.29;
p = 0.05;
X(i) = [18300, 4300, 9500, 14300];
h(i) = [0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8]
′;
a(i) = zeros(N, 1);
j = 0
for i=1:N
a(i) =
1+(1−t+ft)( 1−pfp )
1
λ(i)
t+ft( 1−pfp )
1
λ(i)
;
if a(i) > 1
a(i) = 1;
end
ifa(i) < h(i)
a(i) = h(i);
end
for i=1:N
T (i) = t ∗X(i);
end
end
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